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THE FACTUAL REALITY OF KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS 
Eric Dean Hageman* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”1  On its face, this language provides private actors 
monetary relief for government seizures of their property.  For twenty-
seven years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause more 
expansively, such that it protects property owners seeking land-use 
permits.2  In particular, the Court has interpreted the clause to limit the 
type3 and amount4 of property a government can demand in exchange for a 
land-use permit.  This protection is considered an application of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the field of regulatory takings.5  The 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that a government may not 
deny a private actor a public benefit in order to incentivize the 
relinquishment of a constitutional right.6  Thus, as a general matter, it acts 
 
 *  Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; Bachelor of 
Architecture, University of Notre Dame, 2013.  I thank Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett for 
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Comment’s drafting.  I also thank my co-editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for their 
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 1  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Supreme Court incorporated this provision against 
state and local governments.  See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 255–57 (1897). 
 2  See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 3  See id. 
 4  See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 5  See Molly Cohen & Rachel Proctor May, Comment, Revolutionary or Routine? 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 249 
(2014). 
 6  See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The denial of a 
public benefit may not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive 
enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly.”); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental 
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to vindicate private actors’ constitutional rights by preventing governments 
from coercing them to give up those rights.7  In vindicating the Fifth 
Amendment right to just compensation, the Supreme Court protects private 
actors more than the doctrine would otherwise.  In particular, the Court 
requires that a condition to a land-use permit must bear an “essential 
nexus” to “the end advanced as the justification for” the condition8 and be 
“rough[ly] proportional[]” to the “impact of the proposed development.”9 
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,10 the Court 
extended the unconstitutional conditions doctrine’s protections even further 
in two respects.  First, the Court held that a government’s conditions for 
land-use permits are subject to Nollan’s and Dolan’s nexus and 
proportionality tests “even when the government denies the permit.”11  
Second, the Court subjected such conditions to the same tests when a 
government demands money instead of real property rights.12  The Court 
remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court for the resolution of an 
issue of state statutory law.13 
Writing for four Members of the Court, Justice Kagan dissented.14  
She objected to the second half of the Court’s holding, asserting that the 
extension of Nollan and Dolan to monetary conditions “r[an] roughshod 
over” the Court’s precedents and “threaten[ed] to subject a vast array of 
land-use regulations . . . to heightened constitutional scrutiny.”15  She also 
asserted that the government actor, St. Johns River Water Management 
District (the District), “never demanded anything . . . in exchange for a 
permit” and that as such, the Nollan/Dolan tests should not apply.16  
Finally, she observed that “no taking occurred in this case because 
[petitioner] Koontz never acceded to a demand . . . and so no property 
 
benefit . . . [the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests . . . .”). 
 7  See Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 
699 F.3d 962, 986 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Understood at its most basic level, the [unconstitutional 
conditions] doctrine aims to prevent the government from achieving indirectly what the 
Constitution prevents it from achieving directly.”). 
 8  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 9  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 10  133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 11  Id. at 2603 (emphasis added). 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id.  A Florida statute provided for damages to parties subjected to “an unreasonable 
exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.”  Id. at 
2593 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014)).  The Court remanded the case despite the 
fact that no taking occurred (since the government denied the plaintiff’s permit).  Id. 
 14  Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 15  Id. at 2603–04. 
 16  Id. at 2604. 
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changed hands.”17  From that fact, she concluded that “Koontz therefore 
[could not] claim just compensation under the Fifth Amendment” and that 
the Court should have dismissed the case for that reason.18 
The Court’s opinion in Koontz has elicited many negative reactions in 
academia,19 most of which focus on the expansion of Nollan and Dolan to 
monetary exactions.20  Criticisms run the gamut: some scholars argue that 
the Court was wrong to ignore the environmental impact of land 
developments,21 while others suggest the Court gave the same 
consideration too much credence.22  These criticisms are likely premature 
and necessarily speculative, since the Court decided the case less than two 
years ago. 
 Scholars have scrutinized this case’s factual and procedural history 
less closely, and those elements may justify the Court’s holding.  Two 
often-overlooked facts are particularly important.  First, the government’s 
demand was unusually exploitative—the District offered no sufficient 
justification for the exaction, and it was large in comparison to the 
 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id.  Koontz “brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of action,” id. at 2597 
(majority opinion), and as such, the Court remanded the case to Florida’s courts to decide 
whether his cause of action could survive despite the fact that no actual taking occurred.  Id. 
at 2597, 2603. 
 19  See, e.g., Cohen & Proctor, supra note 5, at 253 (noting that the Koontz Court 
failed to realize the breadth of the decision’s impact); Richard A. Epstein, Modern 
Environmentalists Overreach: A Plea for Understanding Background Common Law 
Principles, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 36–37 (2014) (“[Koontz] invent[ed] a very large 
notion of ‘harm,’ and then announc[ed] that some duty of environmental mitigation shall be 
imposed upon all landowners who have the temerity to want to build on their own land 
without creating a nuisance to anybody.  The performance on every side of this particular 
argument was lamentably incompetent in terms of the way in which it was organized.” 
(footnote omitted)); Israel Piedra, Comment, Confusing Regulatory Takings with Regulatory 
Exactions: The Supreme Court Gets Lost in the Swamp of Koontz, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 555, 555 (2014) (“[I]t was unwise for the Court to apply [Nollan’s and Dolan’s 
restrictions] to monetary exactions.”); Kristin N. Ward, Comment, The Post-Koontz 
Landscape: Koontz’s Shortcomings and How to Move Forward, 64 EMORY L.J. 129, 129 
(2014) (noting that the Court was “unsympathetic to environmental protection at the local 
level” and “suspicious of local government’s ability to make reasoned land-use decisions 
without extorting unfair value from property owners”). 
 20  See, e.g., Cohen & Proctor, supra note 5, at 257 (suggesting Koontz’s impact will 
depend on an aspect of the expansion to monetary conditions); Piedra, supra note 19, at 562 
(describing the expansion of Nollan and Dolan to monetary conditions as “unwise”). 
 21  See, e.g., Ward, supra note 19, at 147 (“[T]he [Koontz] Court makes incorrect and 
unsupported assertions about environmental policy . . . .”); id. (pointing out the Court’s 
description of “local governments as extortionate over-regulators.”). 
 22  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 19, at 37 (“[T]he danger in [Koontz] . . . lies in the ad 
hoc view that the government somehow owns an environmental easement over all property, 
which it will waive only if private individuals engage in acts of environmental mitigation.”). 
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development’s value.23  Second, on remand, the Florida courts read the 
statute under which Koontz brought his claim to allow for monetary 
damages,24 despite the plain language of the statute and the dissent’s 
assertion that it could not be read to authorize the damages.25  These two 
facts, respectively, suggest that the Court’s fear of evading Nollan and 
Dolan was reasonable, and that the Court’s decision to remand the case to 
Florida courts was prudent.  Thus, this Comment will argue that the 
behind-the-scenes reality of the conflict in Koontz justifies the Court’s 
decision. 
This Comment proceeds on the premise that the facts of particular 
cases should inform the way courts shape constitutional law.  That 
proposition is up for debate, but it is not one this Comment addresses.  
Even the most skeptical of readers will find value in knowing more about 
the real-world impact of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
I.     HISTORY 
In 1972, Coy Koontz, Sr.,26 purchased over fifteen acres of 
undeveloped land near the intersection of two highways outside Orlando.27  
Koontz’s neighbors developed the surrounding land intensely, which 
caused his property to be “significantly altered from its original state.”28  
Before or in the midst of that development, the Florida Department of 
Transportation condemned some of Koontz’s property in order to widen 
one of the intersecting highways, thus reducing Koontz’s property to 14.9 
acres.29  A 100-foot-wide power line easement divided the remaining 
property into two portions: approximately 3.7 acres sat north of the 
easement, with the balance of the property south of it.30  The northern 
 
 23  See infra Part IV. 
 24  St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz V), No. 5D06-1116, 2014 
WL 1703942, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting a 
“$376,000 award of compensation to Koontz for the District’s ‘temporary taking’”). 
 25  St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV. 
 26  Coy Koontz, Sr., passed away while this case was being litigated.  His son, Coy 
Koontz, Jr., represented his estate for the remainder of the litigation.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 
2591 & n.1 (majority opinion).  Like the Court, id., this Comment will not distinguish 
between the two men. 
 27  St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz II), 861 So. 2d 1267, 1269 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring). 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id.; see also id. at 1272 (portraying a diagram of the property). 
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section “drain[ed] well; the most significant standing water form[ed] in ruts 
in an unpaved road used to access the power lines.”31 
Over the following years, two Florida statutes impacted the property.  
In the same year that Koontz bought it, Florida passed the Water Resources 
Act, “which divided the State into five water management districts and 
authorized each district to regulate ‘construction that connects to, draws 
water from, drains water into, or is placed in or across the waters in the 
state.’”32  The Act required landowners interested in developments that fell 
within the districts’ jurisdiction to obtain a Management and Storage of 
Surface Water (MSSW) permit, and granted the districts wide discretion to 
issue or deny those permits.33  Twelve years later, Florida enacted the 
Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, which required a 
landowner to obtain a Wetlands Resource Management (WRM) permit to 
“dredge or fill in, on, or over surface waters.”34  Pursuant to the Act, the St. 
Johns River Water Management District adopted a policy of “requir[ing] 
that permit applicants wishing to build on wetlands offset the resulting 
environmental damage by creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands 
elsewhere.”35 
In 1994, Koontz decided to develop the northern section of the 
property.36  To do this, he needed to dredge 3.25 acres of wetlands,37 so he 
applied to the District for MSSW and WRM permits.38  He offered the 
District a conservation easement on the southern section of the property to 
offset his proposal’s environmental effects.39  A District staffer agreed to 
recommend that the District approve the permit if Koontz (a) deeded the 
offered conservation easement and paid to either replace culverts four and a 
half miles away from the property or plug a number of drainage canals on 
property seven miles away, or (b) reduced his development to one acre and 
deed a conservation easement on the remaining fourteen acres.40  The 
District also indicated it would consider alternatives to the suggested offsite 
mitigation.41  In the course of reviewing Koontz’s permit application, 
 
 31  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 32  Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.403(5) (2014)). 
 33  Id. (“[T]he relevant district . . . may impose ‘such reasonable conditions’ on the 
permit as are ‘necessary to assure’ that construction will ‘not be harmful to the water 
resources of the district.’” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.413(1))). 
 34  Id. (quoting 1984 Fla. Laws 204–05). 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Koontz II, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring). 
 38  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 39  Id. at 2592–93. 
 40  Koontz II, 861 So. 2d at 1269. 
 41  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
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Elizabeth Johnson, the District’s “supervising regulatory scientist,” visited 
the site.42  During her visit, Ms. Johnson observed not a single fish or 
animal.43  She later acknowledged that the site contained no fish and that 
she did not perform a wildlife survey of the property.44  Nonetheless, Ms. 
Johnson concluded that Koontz’s development would “adversely affect fish 
and wildlife.”45  As such, the District made its demands, Koontz refused 
them, the District denied Koontz his permit, and a lawsuit commenced.46 
Koontz filed an action in state court, claiming, inter alia, monetary 
relief under a Florida statute that provides damages for parties subjected to 
“an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking 
without just compensation.”47  The trial court applied Nollan and Dolan to 
the offsite-mitigation condition and found that the condition violated both 
standards.48  An intermediate appellate court affirmed, but the Florida 
Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing the case from Nollan and Dolan in 
that (a) the District denied Koontz’s application for a permit because he 
failed to meet its demands, while the government actors in Nollan and 
Dolan issued permits with unconstitutional conditions attached, and (b) the 
District demanded money, while Nollan and Dolan involved interests in 
real property.49  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court.50 
II.     THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito framed the protection at issue as 
an application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and then 
described Nollan’s and Dolan’s history, purposes, and effects.51  The Court 
held that those cases apply to permit denials as well as to permit 
approvals.52  Justice Alito explained that “[t]he principles that undergird . . . 
Nollan and Dolan do not change depending on whether the government 
approves a permit on the condition that the applicant turn over property or 
denies a permit because the applicant refuses to do so.”53  The Court found 
 
 42  Koontz II, 861 So. 2d at 1270. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 47  Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014)). 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. at 2593–94. 
 50  Id. at 2586. 
 51  Id. at 2594–95. 
 52  Id. at 2603. 
 53  Id. at 2595. 
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support for this proposition in cases that condemned conditions to denials 
of other, unrelated public benefits.54  The majority also expressed concern 
that exempting permit denials from Nollan and Dolan “would enable the 
government to evade the limitations of [those cases] simply by phrasing its 
demands for property as conditions precedent to permit approval.”55 
The majority then explained that Koontz suffered a cognizable injury 
despite the fact that no taking actually occurred.  The Florida Supreme 
Court had held that the government’s demand could not have violated the 
Takings Clause because “no property of any kind was ever taken.”56  The 
Court clarified that the Taking Clause protects private actors from the 
actual taking of property and, through the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, from “the impermissible denial of a government benefit.”57  The 
only pertinent difference between conditions that accompany approvals and 
those that accompany denials is that the Fifth Amendment prescribes a 
remedy for the imposition of the former conditions: just compensation.58  
Absent a “consummated taking,” only a separately established cause of 
action can lead to damages.59  A state law created Koontz’s cause of action, 
so the Court passed on what remedies Nollan and Dolan might justify 
absent such a cause of action.60  The majority left it to the Florida courts to 
decide whether the state statute that created Koontz’s cause of action—
which provided monetary damages for “unreasonable exercise[s] of the 
state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation”61—
applied to unconstitutional conditions claims.62 
The Court then held that Nollan and Dolan apply to monetary 
exactions, including the District’s demand for money to pay for offsite 
mitigation.63  As an initial matter, the majority observed that “it would be 
very easy for land-use permitting officials to evade” Nollan and Dolan if 
 
 54  Id. (citing Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). 
 55  Id. 
 56  St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2011). 
 57  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.  “Extortionate demands for property in the land-use 
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property but 
because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just 
compensation.”  Id. 
 58  Id. at 2597. 
 59  Id.; see also id. (“[W]hether money damages are available is not a question of 
federal constitutional law but of the cause of action . . . on which the landowner relies.” 
(emphasis added)).  
 60  Id. 
 61  FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014). 
 62  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 63  Id. at 2603. 
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demands to spend money were not subjected to their limitations.64  In 
expanding Nollan and Dolan, Justice Alito distinguished this case from an 
unfavorable precedent.  A four-Justice plurality previously held in Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel that the United States government’s retroactive 
imposition on a former mining company of an obligation to pay for retired 
employees’ medical benefits “was so arbitrary that it violated the Takings 
Clause.”65  But in the same case, five Justices—one of whom concurred in 
the result and four of whom dissented—concluded that “the Takings Clause 
does not apply to government-imposed financial obligations that ‘d[o] not 
operate upon or alter an identified property interest.’”66  In Koontz, the 
District argued that because five Justices concluded in Apfel that the 
Takings Clause could not apply to a monetary burden, the District’s 
demand for money to pay for offsite mitigation could not be a violation of 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  The Court acknowledged that “[a] 
predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government 
could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do 
what it attempted to pressure that person into doing,”67 but distinguished 
this case in that, unlike Apfel, “the monetary obligation burdened 
petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land.”68  The Court compared 
the District’s hypothetical exaction of Koontz’s money to the taking of a 
lien or of the “right to receive income from land.”69  The majority asserted 
that “[t]he fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link between the 
government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property.”70 
The Court also addressed several of the dissent’s concerns.  First, 
Justice Alito turned to the District’s and the dissent’s arguments that the 
extension of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions allows for “no 
principled way of distinguishing impermissible land-use exactions from 
property taxes.”71  The Court offered a twofold defense: first, the problem 
of distinguishing taxes from takings is not unique to the context of land 
use;72 and second, distinguishing taxes from takings is easier in practice 
than it is in theory.73  To support these points, the Court cited two types of 
monetary seizures previously invalidated as takings: interest on funds held 
 
 64  Id. at 2599. 
 65  Id. (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529–37 (1998) (plurality opinion)). 
 66  Id. (quoting Apfel, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 67  Id. at 2598. 
 68  Id. at 2599. 
 69  Id. at 2600. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. at 2600–01. 
 73  Id. at 2601. 
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in escrow74 and liens.75  The Court also suggested state law will often 
answer the question of what is or is not a tax.76  For example, Florida’s 
statutes “greatly circumscribe[]” how various government entities can go 
about taxation.77 
The Court declined to offer guidance regarding the point at which 
land-use permitting charges rise to the level of taxation, though the opinion 
alluded to a deciding factor being the fee’s arbitrariness.78  The Court was 
careful to preserve governments’ abilities “to impose property taxes, user 
fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on 
property owners.”79 
III.     THE DISSENT 
Writing for four Justices, Justice Kagan dissented, departing from the 
Court’s extension of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions.80  Justice 
Kagan voiced two fundamental objections to the expansion of Nollan and 
Dolan: it violated a valid Court precedent81 and would unduly restrict local 
governments.82  The dissent agreed with the Court that Nollan and Dolan 
apply to permit denials as well as conditional approvals,83 but asserted that 
even on the majority’s terms, the case should have been dismissed instead 
of remanded.84 
The dissent asserted that the Court’s extension of Nollan and Dolan to 
monetary exactions violated Apfel, arguing that the Justices’ consensus—
that the Takings Clause did not apply to monetary exactions—controlled 
the issue.85  Justice Kagan suggested the Court should have resolved 
Koontz’s claim under the regulatory takings doctrine governed by Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.86  The Penn Central doctrine 
 
 74  Id. (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003)). 
 75  Id. (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock 
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)). 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id.  
 78  Id. at 2602 (declining to comment on the point at which “a land-use permitting 
charge denominated by the government as a ‘tax’ becomes ‘so arbitrary . . . that it [is] not 
the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property’” (quoting Brushaber v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916))). 
 79  Id. at 2601. 
 80  Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 81  Id. at 2603–04. 
 82  Id. at 2604. 
 83  Id. at 2603. 
 84  Id. at 2609. 
 85  Id. at 2603–04. 
 86  438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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generally prohibits governments from “unduly restricting the use of 
property.”87 
Justice Kagan’s second major objection was to the decision’s practical 
effects.  She predicted that, absent any meaningful constraints, the 
majority’s view would lead to unnecessary judicial commandeering of local 
law.88  She also criticized the Court’s refusal to explain how one might 
distinguish taxes from exactions.89  The dissent concluded that “the 
majority’s analysis seems to grow out of a yen for a prophylactic rule” that 
would prevent governments from evading Nollan and Dolan, but that there 
was no real problem to be prevented.90  Justice Kagan also commented on 
the dearth of empirical evidence that local governments routinely evade 
Nollan and Dolan when given the chance.91 
The issue of monetary exactions aside, Justice Kagan would have 
dismissed the case on two separate grounds: first, that the District’s 
negotiations with Koontz never rose to the level of “demands,”92 and 
second, that since no taking occurred, the Takings Clause provided Koontz 
with no remedy.93  As to her first argument, Justice Kagan asserted that 
“Nollan and Dolan apply only when the government makes a ‘demand[]’ 
that a landowner turn over property in exchange for a permit.”94  She found 
support for that requirement—that there be a demand over and above a 
mere condition—in the majority’s view that the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine “rests on the fear that the government may use its control over 
benefits (like permits) to ‘coerc[e]’ a person into giving up a constitutional 
right.”95  Justice Kagan predicted that unless Nollan and Dolan were 
limited to “unequivocal” demands, mere negotiations between localities 
and developers would come under judicial scrutiny and thus, “no local 
government official with a decent lawyer would have a conversation with a 
developer.”96  Citing Koontz’s “refus[al]” to return to the negotiating table 
 
 87  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 88  Id. at 2607 (noting that the majority’s decisions might lead to “[t]he Federal 
Constitution . . . decid[ing] whether one town is overcharging for sewage, or another is 
setting the price to sell liquor too high”). 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. at 2608. 
 91  Id. (“No one has presented evidence that in the many States declining to apply 
heightened scrutiny to permitting fees, local officials routinely short-circuit Nollan and 
Dolan to extort the surrender of real property interests having no relation to a development’s 
costs.”). 
 92  Id. at 2609 (“[T]he District never demanded that Koontz give up anything . . . as a 
condition for granting him a permit.” (emphasis added)). 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at 2609–10 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2004)). 
 95  Id. at 2610 (quoting id. at 2594 (majority opinion)). 
 96  Id. 
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with the District, Justice Kagan concluded that “the District never made a 
demand or set a condition.”97 
Justice Kagan’s final ground for dissent was that because there was no 
real taking, Koontz’s only available method of relief was invalidation of 
the condition.98  Koontz’s hope for monetary relief depended on judicial 
construction of the Florida statute that established his cause of action; for 
him to recover, the Court would have to read the statute to allow for relief 
“beyond just compensation.”99  Where the majority remanded the question 
of relief under the Florida statute to the Florida Supreme Court,100 Justice 
Kagan observed that the statute’s plain language “authorize[d] damages 
only for ‘an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a 
taking without just compensation,’” and she concluded that since no taking 
occurred, Koontz could not possibly recover.101 
IV.     ANALYSIS: WHY THE FACTS JUSTIFY THE COURT 
A behind-the-scenes analysis of Koontz reveals two important 
observations.  First, the District’s actions were less justified than either the 
Court or the dissent recognized, suggesting that the majority’s fear of 
localities evading Nollan and Dolan was reasonable.  Second, on remand, 
the Florida courts did in fact read the statute under which Koontz brought 
his claim to allow for monetary damages, justifying the Court’s decision to 
remand the case. 
A thorough reading of the lower courts’ opinions reveals that the 
District’s actions were cause for serious concern.  Concurring with an 
intermediate appellate court’s decision to dismiss the District’s appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction, Judge Robert Pleus wrote a short description of the 
District’s actions in “hope that upon remand to the District, it [would] . . . 
stop the extortionate demands on property owners which this case 
demonstrate[d].”102  Judge Pleus also described the expert testimony 
regarding the environmental value of the property Koontz wanted to 
develop—a crucial aspect of the case, given that the District’s permit-
granting power came from environmental legislation. A 2001 
“environmental audit” of the property indicated that its environmental 
 
 97  Id. at 2611. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. at 2603 (majority opinion). 
 101  Id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014)). 
 102  Koontz II, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., 
concurring). 
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value was already diminished103 and that the environmental impact of the 
proposed development would be “minimal.”104  Two other experts’ 
testimonies supported that finding,105 one noting that the suggested “offsite 
mitigation was unnecessary and ‘very excessive.’”106  At trial, the District 
offered the testimony of Elizabeth Johnson, its in-house “supervising 
regulatory scientist” who, despite observing not a single fish or animal on 
the site, “concluded that the proposed development would adversely affect 
fish and wildlife.”107  The rest of the Florida courts’ opinions and orders 
contain a shocking dearth of evidence that Koontz’s development would 
have a cognizable environmental impact.108 
Judge Pleus’s description sheds light on the Supreme Court’s decision, 
not because of the ridiculousness of the District’s assertion that Koontz’s 
development would have a real environmental impact,109 but because it 
highlights that the District’s actions demonstrated incompetence, if not 
malice.  It is shocking that in twenty years—from the litigation’s 
commencement in 1994 through its final disposition in 2014110—the 
District was unable to prove that the development would have any 
cognizable environmental impact.  The Supreme Court’s discussion of this 
aspect of the case is short and mild,111 but the concern that refusing to 
expand Nollan and Dolan to monetary conditions “would enable the 
government to evade” those standards “simply by phrasing its demands for 
property as conditions precedent to permit approval”112 might be quite 
 
 103  See id. at 1269 (explaining that an expert witness testified that the property “had 
been impacted by surrounding roads, a drainage ditch, a power line easement and 
urbanization”). 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. at 1269–70. 
 106  Id. at 1270. 
 107  Id. 
 108  See, e.g., St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz IV), 5 So. 3d 8, 9–
10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the entirety of the case’s factual and procedural 
history, with no mention of any environmental impact the development may have 
threatened); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI 94-5673, 2002 WL 
34724740, at 873–74 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002) (noting that the District failed to satisfy 
Nollan and Dolan, with no mention of environmental impact); Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI 94-5673, 1997 WL 34854535, at 514 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 
1997) (dismissing Koontz’s original complaint, with no mention of environmental impact). 
 109  By itself, that information would only inform a Dolan rough proportionality 
inquiry, and the question before the Court was whether Dolan should apply at all. 
 110  See Koontz V, No. 5D06-1116, 2014 WL 1703942, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 
30, 2014) (affirming the trial court’s disposition). 
 111  See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–93 
(2013). 
 112  Id. at 2595. 
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strong in the face of a state agency that evidently felt no need to justify 
exacting up to $150,000 from a private citizen.113  Perhaps this history 
indicates nothing but incompetence or a bureaucratic oversight.  But if the 
District’s actions were malicious or manipulative—or indicated a larger 
movement towards the unjustified exaction of private money in the 
permitting process to serve policy goals—they may provide a novel 
defense of the majority’s opinion. 
Second, the Florida courts’ resolution of the case on remand indicates 
that the majority was right not to dismiss the case.  Justice Kagan colorfully 
asserted that the State of Florida is not the “inside-out, upside-down 
universe” in which “a law authorizing damages only for a ‘taking’ also 
provide[s] damages when (as all agree) no taking has occurred.”114  Alas, 
there remains an argument that the State of Florida is precisely that 
universe.  On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Florida 
Supreme Court in turn remanded the case to the intermediate appellate 
court.115  The appellate court affirmed $376,000 in damages116 to Koontz 
for the taking that all nine Supreme Court Justices agree never occurred.  
Dissenting from the appellate court’s affirmation, Judge Griffin observed 
that in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s decision, 
“[b]ecause there was no ‘taking’ . . . the question remain[ed] whether 
Koontz ha[d] a damages remedy under” the Florida statute.117  However, 
neither the appellate court nor the Florida Supreme Court expressly 
reviewed that question,118 and after the smoke cleared, the $376,000 award 
still stood.119 
Surely the award indicates that Justice Alito was right to remand the 
case.  If the Florida appellate court interpreted the statute sub silentio to 
allow for monetary damages in situations like Koontz’s, dismissing the 
case would have gravely intruded on a state’s right to interpret its own 
laws.  Whether the Florida appellate court was right to interpret (or not 
interpret) the statute as it did is beyond the scope of this Comment—the 
 
 113  See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, slip op. at 868 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 2002), available at 2002 WL 34724740 (noting that the offsite 
mitigation “could cost between $90,000.00 and $150,000.00,” but also acknowledging 
“there is evidence it could cost as little as $10,000.00”). 
 114  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 115  St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 129 So. 3d 1069, 1069 (Fla. 2013). 
 116  Koontz V, No. 5D06-1116, 2014 WL 1703942, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 
2014) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting the still-valid “$376,000 award of compensation to 
Koontz for the District’s ‘temporary taking’”). 
 117  Id. at *4. 
 118  See id. at *2 (majority opinion) (summarily adopting and reaffirming Koontz IV in 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision); see also Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009) (acknowledging the award of damages for the alleged taking). 
 119  Koontz V, 2014 WL 1703942, at *2 (affirming the trial court’s disposition). 
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point is that Justice Alito’s decision to remand demonstrated restraint, 
wisdom, and laudable sensitivity to federalism concerns.  Far from an 
empty formality, the decision had a six-digit impact on the litigants. 
CONCLUSION 
The behind-the-scenes reality of Koontz—in particular, the 
extortionate actions of St. Johns River Water Management District and the 
Florida courts’ decision to award monetary damages—indicates that the 
Court was right to dispose of the case as it did.  In particular, the District’s 
behavior may have justified the majority’s concern that localities would 
evade the constitutional requirements of Nollan and Dolan, and the award 
of damages, notwithstanding the Florida statute’s clear language, shows 
that the majority was right to remand the case.  The effects of expanding 
Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions remain to be seen, but the Court’s 
resolution of the facts before it was certainly justified, if not admirable. 
 
